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Summary
Haiti and its multilateral and bilateral donors developed an international
assistance strategy, known as the Interim Cooperation Framework (ICF), to address
Haiti’s short-term needs between the collapse of the government of President Jean-
Bertrand Aristide in February 2004 and the initial phase of a new government
scheduled to be inaugurated in February 2006.  The World Bank,  the Inter-American
Development Bank, the United Nations, and the European Union co-sponsored the
International Donors Conference on Haiti in Washington, D.C., on July 19-20, 2004.
The objective of the conference was to garner international financial support for the
ICF, which outlines Haiti’s priority needs and programs for 2004-2006.
The Interim Cooperation Framework establishes priority  needs and projects that
fall under four broad categories, or “axes”: political governance and national
dialogue; economic governance and institutional development; economic recovery;
and access to basic services.  For each of these four strategic axes, the Framework
provides a strategy, priority objectives, and monitoring indicators.  
Many congressional concerns regarding Haitian development are addressed by
the priorities and programs outlined in the Interim Cooperative Framework.  The
main congressional concerns expressed regarding the Donors Conference strategy is
the rate at which funds are being disbursed and the effectiveness of the aid being
provided.  International organizations and governments pledged $1.085 billion, to be
disbursed over a two and a half-year period, from July 2004 through September 2006,
eight months into a new administration, if elections proceed according to schedule.
Initial disbursement was slow.  According to the World Bank, however, the rate
of disbursement began to improve after about six months.  At just under the halfway
point of the Donors Conference time-frame, a little less than half of the pledged
funding had been disbursed, a tentative estimate of $500 million as of July 2005.
Disbursement has been uneven among donors.  The United States has disbursed
about half of its pledged funds.
Some progress has been made toward the objectives outlined in the Interim
Cooperation Framework, including voter registration, improvements in fiscal
transparency, jobs creation, and broader access to clean water and other services.
Current law related to funding of U.S. assistance to Haiti includes P.L. 108-25,
P.L. 108-199,  P.L. 108-324,  P.L. 108-447, and  P.L. 109-13.  Pending legislation
related  to funding of U.S. assistance to Haiti includes H.R. 611, H.R. 945, H.R.
1130, H.R. 1213/S. 704, H.R. 2601, H.R. 3057, and S. 600.
See also CRS Report RL32294, Haiti: Developments and U.S. Policy Since
1991 and Current Congressional Concerns, by Maureen Taft-Morales, and CRS
Report RL32733, Latin America and the Caribbean: Issues for the 109th Congress,
Mark P. Sullivan, Coordinator.  This report will be updated as warranted.
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Haiti: International Assistance Strategy for
the Interim Government 
and Congressional Concerns
Haiti and its multilateral and bilateral donors saw the need to develop an
international strategy for assistance to address Haiti’s short-term needs in between
the collapse of the government of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide and the
installation of a new, elected government.  Haiti experienced a socio-economic crisis
surrounding Aristide’s departure in February 2004, followed by disastrous floods in
May 2004.  Armed violence, and the absence or further deterioration of public
services, further exacerbated these conditions.  International donors agreed that all
of these factors made the needs for humanitarian aid and protection extremely urgent.
In response to these urgent needs, Haiti’s interim government and international
agencies developed a strategy for international assistance entitled the Interim
Cooperation Framework.  The authors of this framework presented it at an
International Donors Conference on Haiti in July 2004.  Bilateral and multilateral
donors made pledges of financial and other support at the conference.  
The Interim Cooperation Framework establishes priority  needs and projects that
fall under four broad categories, or “axes.”  The first axis, “Strengthen Political
Governance and National Dialogue,” addresses security, police, and disarmament;
the judicial system and human rights; and the electoral process.  The second axis,
“Strengthen Economic Governance and Institutional Development,” promotes
improved and more transparent management of public finances; strengthening the
capacities of public institutions; and decentralization in favor of regional, urban, and
local preparation of development strategies.  The third axis is “Promote Economic
Recovery.”  It aims to reverse Haiti’s trend of economic regress by promoting
macroeconomic stability; providing reliable electricity; reviving the  private sector;
and providing jobs and access to micro-finance.  Economic Recovery programs also
aim to help farmers meet their needs; improve roads and transport; and rehabilitate
and protect the environment.  
“Improve Access to Basic Services” is the fourth axis.  Because basic services
are so scarce in Haiti, the priorities in this category are many.  They range from
immediate goals such as providing emergency humanitarian aid to more long-term
goals.  Health- related goals include increasing the availability of potable water and
lavatories; extending minimal health services and improving access to them,
improving the ability to address food security, and improving solid waste
management.  Programs also include improving the quality of and access to
education at all levels; engaging disadvantaged youth; supporting Haitian artisans;
and reinforcing the media as a means of promoting pluralism and democracy.  Other
priorities include improving slums and the government’s ability to provide social
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1 Republic of Haiti, “Interim Cooperation Framework 2004-2006: Summary Report,” United
Nations, European Commission, World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, July
2004.  Available at [http://worldbank.org/haitidonors2004].
safety nets and protection.  For each of these four strategic axes, the Framework
provides a strategy, priority objectives, and monitoring indicators.
Authors of the Interim Cooperative Framework cite as one of the strategy’s
strengths its inclusive and participatory nature; they consulted members of civil
society, the private sector, and political parties.  The ICF is designed to be a link
between short-, medium-, and long-term efforts at revitalizing Haiti.  Some observers
believe that the international community must be prepared to make a long-term
commitment to make the changes begun under the ICF sustainable and long-lasting.
Haitian institutions have limited capacity to absorb assistance and execute plans.  The
ICF authors themselves warn that absorptive capacity “can only be improved in a
gradual manner, [and] must be taken into consideration; otherwise , the system will
collapse.” (ICF, p. 6) The plan therefore emphasizes strengthening Haitian
government structures.  Some observers argue that, until those institutions are made
more capable, however, international actors should take a stronger role in
implementing the Interim Cooperative Framework.
Progress has been made under all of the ICF axes.  With the support of
international donors, the interim government has  registered voters; prepared a budget
before the fiscal year began for the first time since 1996; begun to implement fiscal
discipline; and extended some basic services.  Much remains to be done.  Some
critics believe that the government and/or international donors have not done enough
to establish conditions for free and fair elections, reduce human rights violations, or
include all parties, especially the Lavalas party, in political dialogue.
The Interim Cooperative Framework addresses many congressional concerns
regarding development in Haiti: promotion of democratic governance and political
stability; effective and transparent use of domestic and international funds; and
economic development and reduction of poverty.  The main congressional concerns
expressed regarding the Donors Conference strategy are the rate at which funds are
being disbursed and the effectiveness of the aid being provided. Both donors and the
interim Haitian government share responsibility for the initially slow disbursement
of funds.  Disbursement has increased, but Haiti’s capacity to absorb funds, donors’
concerns over transparency of government spending, and political instability continue
to pose obstacles to the execution of the ICF programs.
International Donors Conference
The World Bank,  the Inter-American Development Bank, the United Nations,
and the European Union co-sponsored an International Donors Conference on Haiti
in Washington, D.C., on July 19- 20, 2004.  Representatives from 30 countries and
32 international organizations attended.  The sponsors held the conference to garner
financial support for the international assistance strategy, known as the Interim
Cooperation Framework (ICF), which the interim Haitian government developed in
conjunction with the four sponsoring organizations.1  The ICF, released in July 2004,
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outlines Haiti’s priority needs and programs for 2004-2006.  The Interim Cooperation
Framework will provide assistance during the interim government, and through
September 2006, which will be the end of the fiscal year and eight months into the
newly elected government if elections proceed as scheduled.  Its short term goal is
stabilization, with the intention that ICF programs will lead to a participatory process
that will produce a long term strategy for poverty reduction.
The Interim Cooperation Framework estimated Haiti’s needs to total $1.37
billion, and sought $924 million through the donors conference to meet the two-year
funding gap.  The sponsors announced on July 20 that international organizations and
governments had pledged $1.085 billion over the next two years  to help Haiti rebuild
its infrastructure, strengthen institutions, and improve basic services. The United
States committed to provide $230 million for FY2004-FY2005.  Donors have held
several conferences since July 2004 reaffirming the support of the international
community for Haiti’s transition process under the Interim Cooperation Framework.
Aristide’s government fell apart amidst violent protests and pressure from the
United States, France, and others.  Aristide went into exile, eventually landing in
South Africa, where he remains today.  An interim government was established, with
Supreme Court Chief Justice Boniface Alexandre assuming the Presidency, as
outlined in the Haitian constitution, on February 29, 2004.  That same day, the United
Nations unanimously authorized an international force to help restore order, which
was replaced in June 2004 by a U.N. peacekeeping force.  Gerard LaTortue was
appointed Prime Minister through a compromise process.  The interim government
negotiated an agreement with opposition political groups to delay elections until the
fall of 2005, with a new president to be sworn in on February 7, 2006.  The
government has already postponed elections several times this fall, and reportedly has
now scheduled presidential and legislative elections for December 27, and runoff
elections for January 31, 2006.
A weak political structure combined with ongoing political tensions, violence,
and human rights violations make it difficult to pursue the goals of the Interim
Cooperation Framework.  Some observers express concern that, unless security
conditions improve quickly and opposition parties feel free to participate, organizing
elections that will be considered free, fair, and safe will be extremely difficult.  (For
more information on Aristide’s terms and the interim government, see CRS Report
RL32294, Haiti: Developments and U.S. Policy Since 1991 and Current
Congressional Concerns, by Maureen Taft-Morales.)
The Interim Cooperation Framework addresses many of the developmental
concerns for Haiti that have been expressed by Congress.  Congressional concerns
about its implementation center around the rate at which funds are being disbursed,
and the effectiveness of the assistance provided.
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The Interim Cooperation Framework: Establishing Priorities
The interim government of Haiti developed the Interim Cooperation Framework
in conjunction with the World Bank,  the Inter-American Development Bank, the
United Nations, and the European Union.   In addition to many offices of the interim
Haitian government, some 32 foreign governments and international organizations,
and eight Haitian associations contributed in some form to the two-year development
plan.  Over 170 international and Haitian organizations were consulted during the
preparation of the Interim Cooperation Framework.
There is an unprecedented amount of coordination for aid to Haiti among donors
and with the government for the Interim Cooperation Framework.  A Joint
Committee for the Implementation and Monitoring of the Interim Cooperation
Framework includes members of the Haitian government, Haitian civil society, and
the donor community.  The Prime Minister, Planning Minister, and Finance Minister
represent Haiti; the Inter-American Bank, the U.N. Development Programme
(UNDP), the World Bank, and foreign aid agencies for the United States (USAID),
Canada, and the European Union represent the donors; and the Civil Society
Initiative, Growth Group, and the Association of Artisans represent Haitian civil
society.  This committee conducts the oversight of the ICF.  Reporting to the
Committee through a Secretariat are “sectoral tables.”  There are several sectoral
tables for each pillar of the ICF. Haitian government and donor counterparts lead
small groups in monitoring the implementation of ICF projects for individual sectors,
or groups of sectors, such as the Sector Table for Agriculture and Water and
Sanitation. The donors have also held meetings to discuss the rate of progress,
shortfalls, and shifts of funds to respond to emerging priorities.
The Interim Cooperation Framework establishes priority  needs and projects that
fall under four broad categories, or “axes”: political governance and national
dialogue; economic governance and institutional development; economic recovery;
and access to basic services.  For each of these four strategic axes, the Framework
provides a strategy, priority objectives, and monitoring indicators.  Each axis of the
Framework, its priorities, and the projects designed to address them are discussed
below. 
Axis 1: Strengthen Political Governance and National Dialogue.
Politics in Haiti have generally been violent and authoritarian ever since Haiti
became an independent republic in 1804.  Haiti was headed by some 30 despotic
rulers from independence to the collapse of the 30-year Duvalier dictatorship in 1986.
In the late 1980s, a strong democratic movement emerged leading to a new
constitution that guaranteed  personal liberties, distributed power among a president,
a Prime Minister, and two legislative chambers, and created an independent judiciary
and an electoral council to oversee democratic elections. The first elections that were
generally considered free and fair were held in 1990, bringing Aristide to power.
Nascent democratic institutions were frail, however, and authoritarian traditions
strong.  Succumbing to a long tradition in Haiti, President Aristide was ousted by
violent means – in this case a military coup – in 1991.  After he was restored to office
by a U.S.-led military force in 1994, neither he nor his successor, Rene Preval, was
able to maintain fully functioning governments or hold fully credible elections.  
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America/Caribbean Report No. 13, May 31, 2005.
Although the 1987 constitution remains in force, many of its provisions are not
respected in practice.  No parliament has been regarded by the international
community or the opposition  as fully legitimate since 1997. The Department of State
Human Rights Report for 2004 calls Haiti’s judicial system “largely moribund,” and
“subject to significant influence by the executive and legislative branches.”  Political
parties are mostly vehicles for individual ambitions. Haitian society has become
increasingly polarized.  Some observers have criticized successive Haitian
governments for tolerating, and in some cases facilitating, violence against members
of the opposition.  At the same time, observers criticize the opposition for also
employing violent means, and for limiting themselves to a strategy of rejection rather
than negotiation.2
The priorities under this axis include programs directed at:
! Security, police and demobilization, disarmament and
reintegration.  Priorities include enhancing security by
professionalizing the Haitian National Police and disarming the
numerous illegal armed groups in the country.  The police force
became politicized under Aristide. Armed groups include Aristide
supporters and rebels who contributed to Aristide’s ouster.  Violence
increased during the months preceding that ouster, and part of
MINUSTAH’s mission is to help the government demobilize and
disarm these groups and try to reintegrate them into Haitain society.
! Justice, penitentiary institutions and human rights.  Priorities
include taking measures against impunity, and promoting judicial
independence and capacity through training of judicial and
penitentiary personnel, and rehabilitation of physical infrastructure;
promoting respect for human rights and basic freedoms by
strengthening government institutions responsible for protecting
citizens from abuse by the government; and promoting cooperation
between the government and non-governmental organizations that
promote and protect human rights.
! Electoral process.  Priorities include holding free, credible
elections, with the U.N. mission (MINUSTAH) and the
Organization of American States (OAS) supporting Haiti’s
Provisional Electoral Council in organizing the elections and
ensuring security for them.  Presidential and legislative elections are
scheduled for fall of 2005, with the transfer of power to take place
on February 7, 2006, but the dates have been changed several times
and may be postponed yet again. 
! Promotion of national dialogue.  Priorities include encouraging
political dialogue among all sectors of Haitian society to promote
national reconciliation, and solutions to local and national problems
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based on consensus.  The Interim Cooperation Framework is
considered part of this process.  By involving many sectors of
society in creating  national plans of development such as the ICF,
a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, and Millennium Development
Goals, the interim government and the international community
hope to establish a framework for national dialogue revolving
around development priorities.
Axis 2: Strengthen Economic Governance and Institutional
Development.  Use of public coffers for personal wealth has gone on for much of
Haiti’s history.  It became so rampant under the Duvalier regime (1957-1986) that it
became known as a “kleptocracy.”  According to the ICF (p.18), “Weaknesses in
economic governance have been one of the most serious impediments to economic
growth and poverty reduction in Haiti,” and “[T]he current state of economic
governance is dismal.”  
The priorities under this axis include programs directed at:
! Economic governance.  Priorities include making the budget
process transparent and efficient by implementing a state accounting
system, strengthening control mechanisms for use of public funds
and procurement, and other reforms.  The ICF also calls for better
management of public finances by expanding the tax base and
improving the allocation and management of public funds by
attacking corruption.
! Strengthening of institutional capacities.  Priorities include
improving human resources in public administration by recruiting
qualified young officials, from the Haitian diaspora as well as from
within Haiti, providing “massive” training, and significantly
improving compensation.
! Regional, urban and local development and decentralization.
Priorities include implementing structures at the local level which
will prepare strategies for development based on needs as identified
by the community. The ICF also calls for  the interim government to
prepare policies for decentralization, and regional, urban, and local
development to submit to the next government.
Axis 3: Promote Economic Recovery.  Haiti is the poorest country in the
western hemisphere, and one of the poorest countries in the world, ranking 150th
among 175 countries in the U.N.’s Human Development Index. In 1997 the U.N.
described Haiti as having an “economy in regress,” meaning that “the living
standards and conditions of the majority, or a large part, of the population have fallen
substantially,”3   and its economy has mostly continued to decline since then.  The
tasks that must be undertaken to promote economic recovery and create jobs are
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enormous.  Haiti must establish macro-economic stability, rehabilitate infrastructures
such as electricity and roads, and develop the private sector.  In addition, agricultural
production must be improved, while protecting the environment, which has greatly
deteriorated.
The priorities under this axis include programs directed at:
! Macroeconomic stability. In conjunction with the International
Monetary Fund, the interim government designed a macroeconomic
program whose purpose is to contain inflation at 14%, rehabilitate
key public facilities, and provide essential services. According to the
ICF, this will be difficult to achieve without budgetary discipline on
the part of the government.
! Electricity. Priorities include improving the production and
distribution of electricity by attacking corruption and
mismanagement of the independent public corporation, Electricity
of Haiti, which has the monopoly on electricity.  According to the
ICF, about 90 percent of Haitians have no access to electricity.
! Development of private sector and small- and medium-size
enterprises/industries.  Priorities include helping to revive the
private sector by making various funds available to small businesses,
combating corruption, developing a commercial code and
encouraging integration of Haiti into regional and international
markets.
! Rapid job creation and micro-finance.  Priorities include creating
jobs through labor intensive work programs, especially in public
programs to improve infrastructure.  According to the ICF (p. 25),
“Almost 1 out of every 2 Haitians between the ages of 20 and 45
does not have a lucrative occupation.”  The framework calls for
creating about 687,000 jobs from 2004-2006, and increasing access
to micro-credit, especially for women.
! Agriculture.  Priorities include improving the capacity of
agricultural workers to meet their needs in the short term by
supplying vaccinations, conducting disease control, repairing farm
equipment, and distributing tools and seed.  Various sorts of
technical assistance in agricultural techniques are called for in the
medium term.  The report recommends rehabilitation of part of the
Ministry of Agriculture “to restore its minimal intervention
capability,” and training of Ministry of Agriculture staff, farmers
organizations, and others to maximize the effectiveness of such
interventions.  Although 45% to 50% of Haiti’s working population
is engaged in agriculture, 80% of farmers cannot meet the basic food
needs of their families (ICF, p. 26).
! Roads and transportation.  Transportation infrastructure, which
includes roads, airports, airstrips, and harbors, are in great need of
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investment and maintenance, as they are in “a state of very advanced
dilapidation,” according to the ICF (p. 27).  Priorities include
making roads that are necessary for development usable at all times,
by quickly conducting road rehabilitation work, and then setting up
financial and institutional mechanisms for managing and
maintaining them.  Currently, only 5% of 3,400 kilometers of roads
are in good condition.  The strategy also calls for identifying and
quickly investing in whatever is necessary to maintain continuity of
port and aviation activity, and improving port management.
! Environmental protection and rehabilitation.  Priorities include
promoting sustainable use of natural resources through reduced
reliance on wood fuel; planning and carrying out of activities aimed
at halting degradation of land and natural resources; and supporting
the development and implementation of disaster management plans.
Haiti is caught in a vicious cycle that makes the land unable to
sustain the needs of its inhabitants and vulnerable to natural
disasters.  Because farmers lack the means to invest in more efficient
technology, they employ unsustainable methods, such as cutting
down trees for wood fuel, which contributes to deforestation, which
leads to soil erosion, which leads to inadequate agricultural
production, and continued poverty. The program focuses on
supporting local initiatives and the development of national plans to
manage natural resources effectively.
 
Axis 4: Improve Access to Basic Services.  Much of Haiti’s population
lacks access to basic services.  According to the World Health Organization, only
28% of Haitians have access to sanitation, and 46% have access to improved water
sources. There are only 25 doctors per 100,000 people.  These conditions leave the
majority of the population vulnerable to disease and malnutrition, without
educational resources or social safety nets.
The priorities under this axis include programs directed at:
! Emergency humanitarian aid and post-disaster relief.  Priorities
include responding to the various crises in 2004 with emergency
humanitarian aid.  Haiti experienced a socio-economic crisis
surrounding the collapse of the Aristide government in February
2004, followed by the disastrous floods of May 2004.  Armed
violence, including looting of stockpiles of humanitarian assistance.
For much of the population, already limited access to basic social
services and food, and the absence of many public services or further
deterioration of what few services existed,  made conditions worse.
All of these factors, according to the ICF (p. 30), make “the needs
for humanitarian aid and protection extremely urgent.” 
! Furthermore, Haiti has become increasingly vulnerable to natural
disasters.  Haiti is described by the UNDP as being one of the most
vulnerable countries in the world for natural catastrophes due to
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cyclones and floods.4  Therefore, another element of this component
of the ICF takes a longer view of post-disaster relief, calling for
strengthening governmental authorities’ ability to identify vulnerable
groups and provide them assistance, and identifying humanitarian
needs not met by current initiatives, such as long-term reconstruction
and restoration of areas most affected by the 2004 floods.  
! The ICF also notes that while some humanitarian assistance is
provided for in the plan, it is essential for the government and the
international community to develop a means of periodically
assessing humanitarian needs.  It also calls on the government to
develop a “rehabilitation and reconstruction program with a
preventative approach” for flood-affected areas.
! Water and sanitation.  Priorities include increasing the production
and delivery of potable water by strengthening institutional capacity
and conducting studies for further improvement in the long-term.
More than half (54%) of all Haitians lack access to improved water
sources.  According to the ICF (p. 31), almost 60% of rural
households, and almost 40% of urban households outside major
metropolitan areas do not have a lavatory inside or outside of their
homes. About 9% of homes in metropolitan areas have no lavatory.
On a positive note, the ICF states that where beneficiary communities have been
actively involved in water projects, there has been some improvement in access to
potable water.
! Health and nutrition.  Priorities include extending minimal health
services by restarting the operation of the principal hospitals; and
strengthening the  ability of the Public Health and Population
Ministry to manage and coordinate health care and coordinate its
activities with international and non-governmental health
organizations.  The ICF also calls for the renewal of priority
programs, such as systematic vaccinations, and for improved access
to health care for both the general population and vulnerable groups.
The latter includes children, pregnant women, handicapped and
HIV/AIDS-infected people, and indigents.  The ICF’s strategy for
improving access and restarting priority programs entails regulating
and lowering prices for generic drugs and for essential supplies and
services, and establishing a national system for their purchase and
distribution.
! Education, youth, and sports.  This component of the ICF
addresses three levels of education: basic; professional training; and
university.  The programs are aimed at improving access to and
conditions of basic primary and secondary education by
rehabilitating schools, improving school environments, and reducing
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the costs of school for vulnerable groups.  Other programs aim to
raise the level of instruction by restoring and improving  teacher
training, “remobilizing” educational personnel, and revising and
distributing literacy and other programs designed to improve the
quality of education.  Currently, about half a million children lack
access to basic education, and a mere 35% of children complete the
5th grade.  The ICF also calls on the government to improve
communication with the private sector, which currently provides
about 80% of the primary education available.
! For professional training, the programs are aimed at increasing
access to, and the relevance and quality of, training.  The programs
will strive to accomplish these goals by strengthening the capacity
of the government institution for professional training, and
identifying the training needs of the workforce and then recruiting
the personnel to meet those needs.  Currently, “only 6 out of every
1,000 workers in the workforce have a diploma or certificate in a
technical or professional field.” (ICF, p. 34)
! For higher education, the initiatives are aimed at reducing the
dropout rate by providing services such as scholarships and food
services; initiating reform to improve access and quality of
educational programs; and, in the short term, repairing damage done
to universities during the political violence of 2004.  The number of
students in higher education almost doubled from 1986 to 1996, but
the dropout rate is extremely high.  Some observers believe that
because the government saw university students as part of an
opposition movement, university facilities were targeted during the
political upheaval and damaged.  Universities also have inadequate
educational and physical materials (ICF, p.34).
! Because Haitian youth “constitute a key factor in the process of
creating a democratic system and promoting economic development
and social progress,” the ICF calls on the Haitian institution
responsible for Youth, Sports and Civics to focus on vulnerable
sectors of the youth, such as disadvantaged youth or those with
substance abuse problems, and to emphasize sports as an activity
that stimulates social cohesion (ICF, p.34).
! Culture, media, and communications.  Priorities include
reinforcing “the role of culture and media in the promotion of a
pluralist and democratic society” by strengthening Haitian broadcast
capacities, especially to be able to support the 2005 election process;
and integrating women and other excluded or disadvantaged groups.
Other projects include preparing a public policy for the protection
and diffusion of Haitian cultural heritage, and funding and
supporting Haitian arts-and-crafts artisans.
! Food security.  Priorities include reinforcing and creating
institutions that are capable of collecting information on and
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implementing plans for addressing food insecurity.  According to the
World Food Program, 40% of Haiti’s population is “food insecure,”
and 16% is “precariously food secure.”
! Slum upgrading.  Priorities include improving slums by
strengthening national institutions and community councils
responsible for urban planning and various public works, and by
carrying out physical improvements.  The ICF notes that although
Haiti is still predominantly rural, the urban population grew at
almost 5% annually, compared to general population growth of
about 2% from 1982 to 2003 (ICF, p.37).  The head of MINUSTAH
has said that allowing conditions in the slums to continue as they are
is “intolerable,” and that improving the quality of life in the slums
would do much to reduce violence and bolster confidence in both the
international community and the Haitian government.5
! Solid waste management. Priorities include ensuring effective
collection and removal of solid waste by actively including the
private sector and private citizens in waste management efforts; and
providing waste treatment and disposal sites that protect the
environment.  The ICF also calls for existing institutions to be
strengthened and new ones to be created that can create and support
solid waste management plans at the national and local level.  The
ICF estimates that under 30% of solid waste is removed in
metropolitan Port-au-Prince, that in other cities most waste is
dumped in rivers, and that many neighborhoods have no waste
removal services at all (ICF, p. 37).
! Safety nets and social protection.  Priorities include laying the
foundation for the respect of fundamental human rights by
conducting large-scale awareness campaigns and issuing identity
documents; reducing malnutrition by providing food and services,
especially to vulnerable groups; increasing access to health care
through micro-insurance; encouraging communities to identify their
development needs and providing international and private sector
funding; offering social assistance services to the most vulnerable
sectors of society; and improving the capacity of the ministry
responsible for social services.  According to the ICF, any assistance
provided by the Haitian government is “very fragmented, scattered,
and without significant impact.”  While most of the social protection
services available are provided by non-governmental organizations,
these groups only have resources sufficient to meet a small
percentage of the population’s needs.
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Strengths and Weaknesses of
 the Interim Cooperation Framework
Authors of the Interim Cooperation Framework cite as one of the strategy’s
strengths its inclusive and participatory nature; they consulted members of Haitian
civil society, the private sector, and political parties in drawing up the plan.  In
addition, the ICF is designed to be a link between short-, medium-, and long-term
Haitian development efforts.  Some of its programs are meant to provide immediate
results, such as emergency humanitarian aid, the creation of jobs, and the provision
of some basic services.  The entire strategy was designed to continue for six months
beyond the interim government, so that the newly elected government, scheduled to
be inaugurated in February 2006, would have financial resources at its disposal and
programs already underway.  Other programs lay the foundation for more long-term
results.  The interim government is using the ICF as a basis for a Poverty Reduction
Strategy for 2006 to 2009, which it is supposed to have ready in time for the next
government.  Generations of corrupt Haitian rulers have used the government as a
means of personal enrichment, neglecting the development of state institutions. In
addition, observers have criticized past interventions for failing to build institutions
or train Haitians to perform government functions after international actors have
departed.  A priority of the ICF is to strengthen the capacity of national institutions
so that the Haitian government can design and provide public services, and manage
its resources more effectively and transparently.
 
Haitian institutions have limited capacity.  The Haitian government is small, and
has few physical resources and skilled personnel to design and implement
development programs. The ICF authors themselves warn that absorptive capacity
“can only be improved in a gradual manner, [and] must be taken into consideration;
otherwise, the system will collapse” (ICF, p. 6). The plan therefore emphasizes
strengthening Haitian government structures, building up fragile institutions, and in
some cases, creating entirely new ones.  Some observers argue that, until those
institutions are made more capable, however, international actors should take a
stronger role in implementing the Interim Cooperation Framework and other
development plans.  In light of Haiti’s chronic political instability, some have
suggested making Haiti an international protectorate. Others suggest that a
multilateral donor commission should be formed to oversee and ensure accountability
of international financial assistance.  Still others propose that the donor community
assume greater responsibility for planning and implementing development projects
so that donor funds could be better absorbed.6
Some observers express concern that the elections system being established by
MINUSTAH, the OAS, and the interim government under the ICF relies too heavily
on sophisticated technology not suitable for a country where electricity is unreliable
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or not available in much of the country, and where half the population is illiterate.
Some observers argue that current conditions are not conducive to free, fair and safe
elections, and the vote should be postponed until there is greater security.  They also
believe the government must show  that all parties are free to participate.  Former
President Aristide’s party, the Lavalas Family, registered to be able to participate in
the elections.  Nonetheless, some members of the party are urging a boycott until the
interim government ends what they say is political persecution.  Hundreds of party
members, including Aristide’s former Prime Minister, have been held in prison for
months without being charged.  
Others argue that the first step toward stability and security is establishing a
legitimate government through fair and credible elections, and that the elections must
proceed as planned.  U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, during a visit to Haiti
on September 27, 2005, said that those with whom she spoke believed that a new
President must be inaugurated on the constitutionally-mandated date of February 7
in order to promote stability in Haiti.  She also said that the obstacles to meeting that
date were mostly technical problems, and that Haitians must accelerate election
preparations and make full use of the international assistance that is available to
them.  She also said that the elections must be “free and fair and inclusive.”7
Some observers believe that the international community must be prepared to
make a long-term commitment to make the changes begun under the ICF sustainable
and long-lasting.  Since July 2004, donors have held three conferences reaffirming
the international community’s support for Haiti’s transition process under the Interim
Cooperation Framework.  The most recent was held in October 2005 in Brussels.
There, the head of MINUSTAH, Juan Gabriel Valdes, said the donors and Haiti
planned to create a post-election stabilization program.  Valdes, who is also the UN
Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Haiti, said that addressing problems
such as insecurity will require a long-term commitment by the international
community to development in Haiti.8 
Pledges Made to Support the Interim Cooperation Framework
International organizations and governments pledged $1.085 billion at the
International Donors Conference in July 2004 in support of Haiti’s Interim
Cooperation Framework. The funds are to support Haiti’s transition from the Aristide
government through the first eight months of a new government (bringing funding
to the end of FY2006).  Table 1 lists the total pledges made by foreign donor nations
and international organizations for 2004 to 2006. Pledges were made to be distributed
over the almost two and a half year time period of the ICF, not all at once.  The chart
also shows the four major priorities to which the funds will be directed.
In table and graph form, respectively, Table 2 and Figure 1 show total pledges
and disbursements by countries and institutions, by size of pledge, as of March 2005.
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When looking at pledges made as a percentage of national gross domestic product
(GDP), keep in mind that country pledges made for the ICF may not represent all
donor funding related to Haiti. For example, many countries, including the United
States, also contribute to funding of the United Nations and the international financial
institutions, which in turn have made pledges at the Donors Conference. Some
European nations have made bilateral pledges, but contribute to the European Union
funds as well.
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Table 1.  Haiti-International Donors Conference Pledges as of October 2004















Canada $34.0 $7.9 $8.0 $28.9 $78.8 $9.5 $88.3
France 0.0 6.9 3.3 20.8 31.0 1.2 32.2
Germany 0.0 9.6 3.9 0.0 13.5 0.0 13.5
Japan 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.7 2.7 0.0 2.7
Spain 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.6 6.6
Sweden 1.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.8 0.0 1.8
United States 41.6 12.5 28.8 123.7 206.6 0.0 206.6
Institution
EC* $21.5 $11.3 $72.0 35.2 140.0 131.0 271.0
IDB** 0.0 53.0 105.0 105.0 263.0 0.0 263.0
IFAD*** 0.0 0.0 12.0 0.0 12.0 0.0 12.0
World Bank 0.0 19.5 46.0 41.5 107.0 48.0 155.0
All Other 0.0 0.0 1.6 5.1 6.7 9.8 16.5
World Total $98.9 $120.7 $280.6 $362.9 $863.1 $206.1 $1,069.2
Source: Data from World Bank; table prepared by CRS Knowledge Services Group.
Notes: 
* EC: European Commission, development agency of the European Union. 
** IDB: Inter-American Development Bank. 
*** IFAD:  the United Nations’ International Fund for Agricultural Development.
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Table 2.  Haiti-International Pledges and Disbursements











EU* $271.0 $75.7 $11,389,000 0.0024%
IDB* 263.0 38.4 — — 
U.S. 206.6 146.9 12,431,000 0.0017
World Bank 155.0 52.1 — — 
Canada 88.3 81.0 1,069,000 0.0083
U.N.*** — 60.4 — — 
France 32.2 8.4 1,899,000 0.0017
Japan 2.7 9.3 4,002,000 0.0001
World Total 1,069.2 472.1 — — 
Sources: Data from World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank; GDP from EIU Country Data.
Table prepared by CRS Knowledge Services Group,  September 2005.
Notes:
* EU is European Union
** IDB is Inter-American Development Bank
*** U.N. includes United Nations agencies such as UNICEFF, FAO, UNESCO, UNDP and others.
Figure 1.  Haiti-Pledges & Disbursements
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Some statements are in Spanish or French; translations are author’s.
U.S. Pledge Made at Donors Conference.  The United States pledged
about $230 million in FY2004-FY2005 aid to Haiti at the 2004 Donors Conference.
The aid was to be distributed as follows, according to USAID: $22 million for job
creation; $45 million for government infrastructure support; $26 million for
improved security through improved administration of justice; $122 million for
humanitarian aid, including health care, nutrition, and education; and $15 million for
elections support. USAID says that the original pledge will be greatly exceeded,
however.  Assistance for FY2005 was originally to be $52 million, but was recently
increased to a total of about $177 million.  The Bush Administration has requested
$152 million for FY2006.  All USAID programs for Haiti come under the Interim
Cooperation Framework.  
A portion of an additional $100 million appropriated by Congress in
supplemental disaster assistance for the Caribbean region (P.L. 108-324) will go to
Haiti as well.  The emergency supplemental appropriations act for FY2005 (P.L. 109-
13) provides that $20 million in Economic Support Funds “should be made
available” to Haiti, $2.5 million of which “should be made available for criminal case
management, case tracking, and the reduction of pre-trial detention in Haiti.”
Current law related to funding of U.S. assistance to Haiti under the Interim
Cooperation Framework includes the following: the U.S. Leadership Against
HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 (P.L. 108-25); the Foreign
Operations Appropriations Act for FY2004 (P.L. 108-199); the FY2005 Military
Construction Appropriations and Emergency Hurricane Supplemental Appropriations
Act (P.L. 108-324); the FY2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 108-447);
and the FY2005 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the
Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief (P.L. 109-13).  Pending legislation related
to funding of U.S. assistance to Haiti includes the following: the Haiti Economic and
Infrastructure Reconstruction Act (H.R. 611); the New Partnership for Haiti Act of
2005 (H.R. 945); the Jubilee Act of 2005 (H.R. 1130); the Caribbean Basin Trade
Enhancement Act of 2005 (H.R. 1213/S. 704); the FY2006 and 2007 Foreign
Relations Authorization Act (H.R. 2601); the FY2006 Department of State, Foreign
Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act (H.R. 3057); and the FY2006
and 2007 Foreign Affairs Authorization Act (S. 600).  For further information, see
the CRS Legislative Information System at [http://www.congress.gov/], or CRS
Report RL32294, Haiti: Developments and U.S. Policy since 1991 and Current
Congressional Concerns, by Maureen Taft-Morales.
Other Pledges Made at Donors Conference.9  Some donors made
pledges at the International Donors Conference, which are not delineated on the
World Bank charts.  Some of these do not precisely match the categories outlined in
the ICF.  Not all donors pledged a specific monetary amount.  Some noted
contributions that had already been made in 2004, such as humanitarian assistance
following Haiti’s political crisis and natural disasters, or troops for MINUSTAH.
Others expressed a willingness to contribute technical assistance but a need to work
out specific details.  Chile noted, for example, that although it has advanced to  a
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level wherein it has “developed technical and human capabilities in diverse areas,”
it is nonetheless “a country in development that has budgetary limitations” and
therefore needs to work in conjunction with other countries or international
organizations in three-way cooperative efforts.
Argentina.  Argentina is sending 600 members of the Argentine armed forces
to participate in MINUSTAH.
Argentina has offered a legal expert to the U.N. for elections support, and the
government will analyze the way in which to contribute further to electoral and other
MINUSTAH activities.
The Cascos Blancos, or White Helmets, a humanitarian aid organization
supported by the U.N. and OAS, has provided humanitarian assistance, including the
delivery of eight tons of medicine in March 2004 and a technical mission in June
2004 to plan future humanitarian missions.  The Cascos Blancos will also provide
a volunteer force to provide humanitarian help and reconstruction work.
Bahamas.  The Bahamas said it would review the ICF, and consult the OAS,
the Pan-American Health Organization, the Caribbean Community (Caricom) and the
government of Haiti to determine what assistance it would provide.  The government
is also working with non-governmental organizations in the Bahamas and expects
greater participation from them in Haiti.
Belgium.  Belgium is providing 593,000 euros annually in programs regarding
higher education, professional development, production of teaching materials,
potable water in rural areas, and  cultural development.
Brazil.  Brazil has contributed over 1,200 soldiers to serve as the core of
MINUSTAH.  Brazil states that it “is not a net donor of financial resources in the
area of international cooperation or development aid,” but is able to provide technical
assistance.  Is sending a multi-disciplinary mission to Haiti to identify with the GOH
priorities for the transfer of technical knowledge, in projects such as HIV infection
diagnosis, mass vaccination campaigns, and efficient collecting and recycling of
urban waste, some of which could be applied immediately to Haiti.
Chile.  Chile contributed 285 soldiers to the Provisional Multinational Force
for Haiti in March 2004, a “logistical and financial effort without precedent in our
country, at a cost of nearly $5 million dollars.”  It has contributed 585 military and
police personnel and logistical support to MINUSTAH.
Chile contributes to Haiti through regional Caribbean programs.
Chile will send two agronomists to conduct the first stage of an agricultural
rehabilitation program in conjunction with Canada.
Chile is also coordinating and supporting the work of Chilean non-governmental
organizations in Haiti.
Greece.  Greece pledged 100,000 euros.
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Norway.  Norway has organized political dialogue between various political
parties and civil society through its Institute for Political and Social Studies; it held
discussions in Norway in June and August 2004.
Norway allocated about $4.3 million to Haiti for the year 2004.
United Kingdom.  The United Kingdom provided $3.5 million to support
humanitarian efforts following the civil unrest, and another $0.9 million in immediate
humanitarian support to relief operations following flooding in 2004.  Its main
contribution will be through contributions to the European Commission, the World
Bank, the Inter- American Development Bank, and the Caribbean Development Bank
(the amounts of those contributions were not detailed in the U.K.’s pledge statement).
Switzerland.  Switzerland pledged $6.5 million for 2004-2006, with priority
on water and sanitation projects, humanitarian aid, and support to Swiss non-
governmental organizations working on water and sanitation, education, and health.
It will also provide another $1.0 - $1.5 million if able to develop a new project in
environmental management.
Progress to Date10
According to the World Bank and other sources, some progress has been made
toward the objectives outlined in the Interim Cooperation Framework, although much
work remains to be done.  A mid-way assessment of the Interim Cooperation
Framework is expected to be published by the end of 2005.
 
Political Governance and National Dialogue.  Under the “Political
Governance and National Dialogue” axis, some progress has been made in registering
Haitian citizens to vote, and in other aspects of preparing for the upcoming elections.
The dates have been changed several times.  Prime Minister LaTortue says
presidential and legislative elections are now scheduled for December 11 or 18, 2005,
though no official date has been given yet.  Runoff presidential and legislative
elections and local elections will follow after that, with the inauguration of a new
government scheduled for February 7, 2006.  Problems cited  in organizing elections
on time include the following: more voters, especially in remote parts of the country,
need the opportunity to register; hundreds of election supervisors and up to 40,000
poll workers must still be hired or recruited and trained; and polling stations must be
identified.  The electoral council rejected 22 of 54 candidates who applied to run for
president.  Some of these who were rejected are contesting the decision, and ballots
cannot be printed until the Haitian Supreme Court resolves the disputes.
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In terms of promoting national dialogue, structures have been established to
promote civic action in local communities, and local governance structures have been
strengthened to increase citizens’ participation in decision making processes.
Nonetheless, some observers voice concern that the ongoing violence and human
rights violations create an intimidating atmosphere that inhibits dialogue at a national
and local level.
Economic Governance and Institutional Development.  Under the
“Economic Governance and Institutional Development” axis, anti-corruption units
have been created, and improvements in transparency and procurement have been
made.  The interim government prepared a budget for FY2005, the first one to be
prepared before a fiscal year began since 1996-1997.  It is also preparing a budget for
FY2006. Prior to the interim government, some 60% of Haitian government spending
was done outside of a budget, through “discretionary” accounts.  The interim
government has reduced discretionary spending to less than 10%.  It has also
improved cooperation between Haiti and the international financial institutions,
clearing arrears where necessary with aid from donors [see Table 1.].
Previous Haitian administrations were limited in the aid they could receive in
part because they lacked a parliament to authorize spending and the incurring of debt.
The interim government issued a presidential decree, ratified by the Cabinet, vesting
the executive branch with the authority of the legislative branch, including authority
to incur debt. All of these agreements must be published in the official government
gazette.  Much of the donors funds consist of grants, not debt-incurring loans.
Economic Recovery.  In terms of “Economic Recovery,” donors say that
well-designed budgets could also contribute to macroeconomic stability.  The
International Monetary Fund reportedly said that as of March 2005, “[E]xternal trade
has returned to pre-crisis levels, the gourde [Haitian currency] remains stable,
monthly inflation is on the decline, and net international reserves ... have increased.”
Between the pledging of funds in July 2004 and May 2005, approximately 200,000
person-days of work had been created. According to the IMF, “The Haitian
authorities have made progress toward restoring macroeconomic stability and
implementing structural reforms ... [since January 2005.] They implemented the
2004/05 budget without net recourse to central bank financing, and tightened
monetary policy in the face of the difficult macroeconomic and security situation as
well as delays in donor disbursements.”11  Some of those economic reforms include
fiscal discipline, cleaning up the payrolls of state-owned utilities, and reducing
corruption.     
Access to Basic Services.  In terms of “Access to Basic Services,” progress
includes 300 kilometers of rehabilitated and new roads; access to clean water for
250,000 people, and the establishment of committees to manage five new drinking
water systems; access to health services for 400,000 people; provision of over 13,000
scholarships to ensure the return to school of children who attended summer camps
addressing the psycho-social rehabilitation needs of children affected by violence in
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five Haitian cities; the removal of 300,805 cubic meters of solid waste, and the
rehabilitation of almost 200 schools.  
There is also concern as to whether some of these improvements can be
maintained.  For example, electricity service was restored initially, but after U.S.
subsidies ended in March 2005, service fell again.  The interim government increased
tax collection, but donors are uncertain that will be sustained.  Many of the reforms,
such as implementing fiscal discipline and fighting corruption,  require political will
to carry them out.  Observers note that political will to devise and implement reform
has been difficult to maintain in Haiti.
Congressional Concerns
Many congressional concerns regarding development in Haiti are addressed by
the priorities and programs outlined in the Interim Cooperative Framework:
promotion of democratic governance and political stability; effective and transparent
use of domestic and international funds; and economic development and reduction
of poverty.  The main congressional concerns expressed regarding the Donors
Conference strategy is the rate at which funds are being disbursed and the
effectiveness of the aid being provided. 
The interim government, non-governmental organizations, and some Members
complained of slow initial disbursement.  Five months after the Donors Conference
was held, interim Haitian President Boniface Alexandre urged the release of funds,
complaining of “irritating deadlines and [the] slow procedures,” and saying that Haiti
was “virtually on the brink of the abyss.”12  This initial slowness has been
acknowledged by some donors.  According to the World Bank, however, the rate of
disbursement has improved since then.  Near the mid-point of the Donors Conference
time-frame, a little less than half of the pledged funding had been disbursed, an
estimated $400 million as of May, and a tentative estimate of $500 million as of July
2005.13 
The rate of disbursement is affected by several factors.  Pledges were made to
be disbursed not all at once, but over a period of just more than two years, from July
2004 through September 2006, the end of Haiti’s fiscal year, and eight months into
a new administration, if elections proceed according to schedule.  On the part of
many of  the donors, it took several months to get programs designed and authorized
through their own governmental processes.  Furthermore, disbursements have been
uneven among donors.  At the halfway mark, the United States has disbursed about
half of its pledged funds, and Canada more than half.  Japan has disbursed more than
it pledged.  Some other donors have been slower to disburse funds, however, so
program development is very uneven.  
Also, in the case of international financial institutions such as the World Bank
and the Inter-American Development Bank, the intention was to commit to the
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designated amount of funding during the two year period, with the assumption that
disbursing funds and carrying out programs would take longer than that.  Because
successive Haitian governments have not had transparent accounting of their
spending, donors are also wary of transferring funds to the current government.
Therefore, much of the funding is still going through non-governmental
organizations. 
The interim government of Haiti also shares some responsibility for the
difficulties in disbursing the pledged funds early in the process.  As of December
2004, the interim government had still not developed a plan for spending $800
million in donors’ funds, and had just established a commission to oversee bidding
for public contracts.  As it was complaining that international funds were not being
disbursed, the interim government was apparently unaware that it had funds in its
own coffers that were not being spent, until made aware of them by World Bank
officials.14
The Haitian government’s capacity to absorb assistance and execute
development plans remains a problem as well.   As described above, one of the major
goals of the Interim Cooperation Framework is promoting good economic
governance and institutional development by  building up fragile institutions, and in
some cases, creating entirely new ones.  The framework’s authors hope that as
Haitian institutions are strengthened, donor confidence will increase as well.
Currently, observers say one of the greatest obstacles to continued disbursement
of Donor Conference funds and execution of ICF programs is political instability.
Ongoing violence makes delivery of assistance and services difficult.  In recent
months, kidnaping has become a frequent and often deadly occurrence, adding to the
hostile environment for aid workers.  In May 2005, the U.S. State Department
ordered nonessential U.S. personnel to leave, warned U.S. citizens against traveling
to Haiti, and urged those in Haiti to leave, “due to the volatile security situation.”
The Peace Corps withdrew its volunteers from Haiti in June.  The travel warning
remains in effect.15  
The violence obviously creates a hostile environment for ordinary Haitian
citizens, interrupting their ability to work or attend school, and increasing their needs
for social and health services.  In its travel advisory, the State Department further
says that both visitors and residents “must remain vigilant due to the absence of an
effective police force in much of Haiti.”
Many observers, including some Members of Congress, also express concern
that there is an uncertain and intimidating atmosphere that threatens the nation’s
ability to hold elections that will be considered free, fair, and inclusive.  They point
to the detention of members of former President Aristide’s party, the Lavalas Family,
in prison for months without being charged as evidence of political persecution by
the interim Haitian government.  Some observers argue that Haiti needs a process of
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national reconciliation, through national dialogue and elections, so that the country
will be able to arrive at a basic policy consensus on governance and development.16
There is also congressional concern about how much has been accomplished
with donors’ funds to date.  Some might be cautious about further funding because
not much progress has been made in the past despite massive amounts of aid, and
more progress needs to be made in terms of government accountability and
transparency.  Some Members argue that the United States should provide more
funds to have a greater impact on reducing poverty, to enable a more sustained
development effort, and in turn, to prevent massive migration from the country and
help reduce instability.
Some observers believe that the international community must be prepared to
make a long-term commitment to make the changes begun under the ICF sustainable
and long-lasting.  Donors have held several conferences since the first one in July
2004, reaffirming the international community’s support for Haiti’s transition process
under the Interim Cooperation Framework.  At the most recent one, held in October
2005, Juan Gabriel Valdes, the head of MINUSTAH, said the donors and Haiti
planned to create a post-election stabilization program.  Valdes said that in order to
tackle problems such as insecurity, the international community must make a long-
term commitment to Haitian development.17
